区块链资产证券化融资模式创新*
作者：杨招军 李仲飞 2021-10-26 19:01 新传播 【字号：大 中 小】
本文提出基于区块链技术的两次证券化融资模式：第一次证券化以单个企业现金流为支持，设计企业证券，通过出售给发起人（如银行、资产管理公司、政府主导的中小微企业管理机构、政府产业基金管理公司）获得外部融资；第二次证券化汇集发起人持有的中小微企业证券组建资产池，以资产池资产为支持设计资产支持证券，出售给普通或机构投资者。两次证券化融资模式弥补了证券型通证发行（Security Token Offering，简称STO）的两个致命缺陷： STO没有发起人的尽职调查； STO没有资产证券化这一强大分散风险机制。
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